{"id":187,"date":"2026-10-23T17:03:13","date_gmt":"2026-10-23T14:03:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mx1mail.com\/blog\/dnssec-nedir-kurumsal-eposta-dns-kayitlarini-mx-spf-dkim-dmarc-nasil-korur\/"},"modified":"2026-10-23T17:03:13","modified_gmt":"2026-10-23T14:03:13","slug":"dnssec-nedir-kurumsal-eposta-dns-kayitlarini-mx-spf-dkim-dmarc-nasil-korur","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mx1mail.com\/blog\/tr\/dnssec-nedir-kurumsal-eposta-dns-kayitlarini-mx-spf-dkim-dmarc-nasil-korur\/","title":{"rendered":"DNSSEC Nedir ve Kurumsal E-Posta DNS Kay\u0131tlar\u0131n\u0131 (MX, SPF, DKIM, DMARC) Nas\u0131l Korur?"},"content":{"rendered":"<h2>DNSSEC neden e-posta i\u00e7in \u00f6nemlidir?<\/h2>\n<p>Kurumsal e-posta altyap\u0131s\u0131nda g\u00fcvenin temel ta\u015flar\u0131ndan biri DNS\u2019tir. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc bir alan ad\u0131n\u0131n hangi mail sunucusundan e-posta alaca\u011f\u0131 (MX), hangi sunucular\u0131n o alan ad\u0131na ad\u0131na e-posta g\u00f6nderebilece\u011fi (SPF), mesajlar\u0131n hangi anahtarla imzalanaca\u011f\u0131 (DKIM) ve al\u0131c\u0131lar\u0131n do\u011frulama ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131nda nas\u0131l davranaca\u011f\u0131 (DMARC) gibi kritik kararlar DNS kay\u0131tlar\u0131yla duyurulur. DNS yan\u0131tlar\u0131 manip\u00fcle edilebilirse, e-posta trafi\u011fi yanl\u0131\u015f yere y\u00f6nlenebilir veya do\u011frulama mekanizmalar\u0131 devre d\u0131\u015f\u0131 b\u0131rak\u0131labilir.<\/p>\n<p>DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) bu noktada devreye girer. DNSSEC, DNS kay\u0131tlar\u0131n\u0131n b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc ve kayna\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kriptografik olarak do\u011frulamay\u0131 hedefler. Yani sorgulayan taraf (resolver), ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 yan\u0131t\u0131n yetkili b\u00f6lgeden geldi\u011fini ve yolda de\u011fi\u015ftirilmedi\u011fini anlayabilir. Bu, e-posta altyap\u0131s\u0131nda \u00f6zellikle kay\u0131t sahtecili\u011fi (DNS spoofing), cache poisoning ve baz\u0131 man-in-the-middle senaryolar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 \u00f6nemli bir katman sa\u011flar.<\/p>\n<p>Ancak DNSSEC bir \u201cher \u015feyi \u00e7\u00f6zen g\u00fcvenlik kalkan\u0131\u201d de\u011fildir. Ne yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve ne yapmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 do\u011fru anla\u015f\u0131lmazsa, yanl\u0131\u015f beklentiler veya operasyonel kesintiler ortaya \u00e7\u0131kabilir. Bu yaz\u0131, DNSSEC\u2019in e-posta DNS kay\u0131tlar\u0131na etkisini, yayg\u0131n tasar\u0131m hatalar\u0131n\u0131 ve uygulanabilir bir devreye alma plan\u0131n\u0131 anlat\u0131r.<\/p>\n<h2>DNSSEC tam olarak neyi g\u00fcvence alt\u0131na al\u0131r?<\/h2>\n<p>DNSSEC, DNS yan\u0131tlar\u0131n\u0131n imzalanmas\u0131n\u0131 ve do\u011frulanmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flar. Yetkili DNS sunucusu, zone i\u00e7indeki kay\u0131tlar\u0131 kriptografik imzalar; do\u011frulay\u0131c\u0131 resolver ise bu imzalar\u0131, alan ad\u0131n\u0131n k\u00f6kten ba\u015flayan \u201ctrust chain\u201d (g\u00fcven zinciri) \u00fczerinden do\u011frular. Ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 do\u011frulama, yan\u0131t\u0131n de\u011fi\u015fmedi\u011fini ve do\u011fru yerden geldi\u011fini g\u00f6sterir.<\/p>\n<h3>B\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fck (integrity) ve kimlik (authenticity)<\/h3>\n<p>DNSSEC, bir MX kayd\u0131n\u0131n ger\u00e7ekten o domainin yetkili DNS\u2019inden yay\u0131nlan\u0131p yay\u0131nlanmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131; SPF, DKIM public key (TXT), DMARC (TXT) gibi kay\u0131tlar\u0131n yolda de\u011fi\u015ftirilip de\u011fi\u015ftirilmedi\u011fini do\u011frulat\u0131r. Bu sayede sald\u0131rgan\u0131n \u201cSPF\u2019i gev\u015fetmek\u201d, \u201cDKIM anahtar\u0131n\u0131 de\u011fi\u015ftirmek\u201d veya \u201cMX\u2019i farkl\u0131 bir sunucuya \u00e7evirmek\u201d gibi hamleleri daha zor hale gelir.<\/p>\n<h3>Yokluk kan\u0131t\u0131 (authenticated denial of existence)<\/h3>\n<p>DNSSEC yaln\u0131zca var olan kay\u0131tlar\u0131 imzalamaz; bir kayd\u0131n ger\u00e7ekten var olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 da do\u011frulatmaya yarar. NSEC\/NSEC3 mekanizmalar\u0131yla, \u201cbu isimde kay\u0131t yok\u201d yan\u0131t\u0131 da do\u011frulanabilir. Bu, baz\u0131 k\u00f6t\u00fc niyetli y\u00f6nlendirmeleri veya yan\u0131lt\u0131c\u0131 \u201cNXDOMAIN\u201d \u00fcretimlerini azaltmaya yard\u0131mc\u0131 olur.<\/p>\n<h2>DNSSEC neyi \u00e7\u00f6zmez? S\u0131k yanl\u0131\u015f anlamalar<\/h2>\n<p>DNSSEC\u2019i do\u011fru konumland\u0131rmak i\u00e7in s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n\u0131 netle\u015ftirmek gerekir.<\/p>\n<h3>\u0130\u00e7erik \u015fifrelemesi sa\u011flamaz<\/h3>\n<p>DNSSEC, e-postan\u0131n i\u00e7eri\u011fini \u015fifrelemez. E-postan\u0131n iletim s\u0131ras\u0131nda \u015fifrelenmesi TLS\/STARTTLS ile, u\u00e7tan uca gizlilik ise S\/MIME veya OpenPGP gibi y\u00f6ntemlerle ele al\u0131n\u0131r. DNSSEC yaln\u0131zca DNS yan\u0131tlar\u0131n\u0131n do\u011frulanmas\u0131na odaklan\u0131r.<\/p>\n<h3>Kimlik av\u0131 ve sahte e-postay\u0131 tek ba\u015f\u0131na engellemez<\/h3>\n<p>DNSSEC, SPF\/DKIM\/DMARC gibi mekanizmalar\u0131n DNS taraf\u0131n\u0131 korumaya yard\u0131m eder; ancak bir al\u0131c\u0131 taraf\u0131n DMARC uygulamas\u0131, kullan\u0131c\u0131 fark\u0131ndal\u0131\u011f\u0131, anti-phishing kontrolleri ve politika kararlar\u0131 ayr\u0131ca gereklidir.<\/p>\n<h3>Her resolver do\u011frulam\u0131yor olabilir<\/h3>\n<p>DNSSEC\u2019in faydas\u0131, DNSSEC do\u011frulamas\u0131 yapan resolver\u2019lar kullan\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda en y\u00fcksek olur. B\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7ekte do\u011frulama yayg\u0131n olsa da t\u00fcm a\u011flarda garanti de\u011fildir. Bu nedenle DNSSEC, e-posta g\u00fcvenli\u011fi i\u00e7in \u201ckatman\u201d olarak d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fclmelidir.<\/p>\n<h2>E-posta DNS kay\u0131tlar\u0131 DNSSEC\u2019ten nas\u0131l etkilenir?<\/h2>\n<h3>MX kay\u0131tlar\u0131: al\u0131m taraf\u0131nda y\u00f6nlendirme riski<\/h3>\n<p>MX kay\u0131tlar\u0131, inbound e-postan\u0131n nereye teslim edilece\u011fini belirler. DNSSEC aktifken ve sorgulayan taraf do\u011frulama yap\u0131yorsa, MX kayd\u0131n\u0131n de\u011fi\u015ftirilmesi veya sahte yan\u0131tla y\u00f6nlendirme yap\u0131lmas\u0131 daha zorla\u015f\u0131r. Bu, \u00f6zellikle a\u011f i\u00e7inde cache poisoning gibi risklere kar\u015f\u0131 de\u011ferlidir.<\/p>\n<h3>SPF: \u201ckim g\u00f6nderir\u201d beyan\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fcveni<\/h3>\n<p>SPF kayd\u0131 (TXT), al\u0131c\u0131ya \u201cbu domain ad\u0131na e-posta g\u00f6ndermesi beklenen IP\/hostlar \u015funlard\u0131r\u201d der. DNSSEC, bu kayd\u0131n yolda manip\u00fcle edilmesini azalt\u0131r. B\u00f6ylece sald\u0131rgan\u0131n SPF\u2019i ge\u00e7ici olarak geni\u015fletip (\u00f6rne\u011fin kendi IP\u2019sini ekleyip) sahte g\u00f6nderim yapmas\u0131 gibi senaryolar daha zor hale gelir.<\/p>\n<h3>DKIM: public key\u2019in de\u011fi\u015ftirilmesi<\/h3>\n<p>DKIM\u2019de al\u0131c\u0131, DNS\u2019ten public key\u2019i al\u0131r ve imzay\u0131 do\u011frular. DNSSEC, DKIM selector TXT kayd\u0131n\u0131n b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc koruyarak \u201canahtar ikamesi\u201d (key substitution) riskini azalt\u0131r. Not: DKIM anahtar rotasyonu yaparken DNSSEC imzalar\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fcncellenmesi\/yenilenmesi operasyonel plan\u0131n par\u00e7as\u0131 olmal\u0131d\u0131r; aksi durumda do\u011frulama hatalar\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fclebilir.<\/p>\n<h3>DMARC: politika manip\u00fclasyonu<\/h3>\n<p>DMARC kayd\u0131, al\u0131c\u0131ya ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z do\u011frulamada nas\u0131l davranaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6yler. DNSSEC, DMARC\u2019\u0131n \u201cp=reject\u201d gibi kritik politika de\u011ferlerinin sahte yan\u0131tla \u201cp=none\u201da \u00e7ekilmesi benzeri riskleri azalt\u0131r.<\/p>\n<h3>Autodiscover ve istemci otomatik kurulum kay\u0131tlar\u0131<\/h3>\n<p>Bir\u00e7ok kurumda otomatik yap\u0131land\u0131rma i\u00e7in de DNS kay\u0131tlar\u0131 bulunur. DNSSEC, yanl\u0131\u015f yap\u0131land\u0131rma y\u00f6nlendirmeleri ve baz\u0131 sahte servis ke\u015fif yan\u0131tlar\u0131 riskini azaltmaya yard\u0131mc\u0131 olabilir. Yine de istemci taraf\u0131 davran\u0131\u015flar\u0131 ve TLS sertifika do\u011frulamas\u0131 ayr\u0131 katmanlard\u0131r.<\/p>\n<h2>DNSSEC bile\u015fenleri: pratik kavramlar<\/h2>\n<h3>Zone signing: DNSKEY ve RRSIG<\/h3>\n<p>DNSSEC etkinle\u015ftirildi\u011finde zone, anahtarlarla imzalan\u0131r. DNSKEY kay\u0131tlar\u0131, imzay\u0131 do\u011frulamak i\u00e7in gerekli anahtar materyalini yay\u0131nlar; RRSIG kay\u0131tlar\u0131 ise ilgili RRset\u2019in imzas\u0131n\u0131 ta\u015f\u0131r.<\/p>\n<h3>DS kayd\u0131 ve g\u00fcven zinciri<\/h3>\n<p>G\u00fcven zinciri, \u00fcst alan ad\u0131nda (\u00f6r. .com) bulunan DS kayd\u0131yla kurulur. Bu DS kayd\u0131, sizin zone anahtar\u0131n\u0131z\u0131 i\u015faret eder. DS yanl\u0131\u015fsa veya eksikse, do\u011frulay\u0131c\u0131 resolver\u2019lar domaininizi \u201cbogus\u201d olarak i\u015faretleyebilir; bu da baz\u0131 sorgular\u0131n ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olmas\u0131na ve e-posta taraf\u0131nda kesintilere yol a\u00e7abilir.<\/p>\n<h3>NSEC\/NSEC3: yokluk kan\u0131t\u0131<\/h3>\n<p>Alan ad\u0131n\u0131zda var olmayan bir kayd\u0131 soranlara \u201cyok\u201d yan\u0131t\u0131n\u0131n da do\u011frulanabilir olmas\u0131 i\u00e7in NSEC veya NSEC3 kullan\u0131l\u0131r. NSEC3, zone enumeration (zone\u2019daki isimlerin listelenmesi) riskini azaltma amac\u0131yla tercih edilebilir; fakat tasar\u0131m\u0131n operasyonel etkileri de\u011ferlendirilmelidir.<\/p>\n<h2>DNSSEC devreye alma plan\u0131: kesinti riskini azaltan yakla\u015f\u0131m<\/h2>\n<p>DNSSEC, do\u011fru planlanmazsa \u201ck\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck\u201d bir DNS de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011finin bile geni\u015f etki yaratabilece\u011fi bir aland\u0131r. Bu nedenle kontroll\u00fc ilerlemek \u00f6nemlidir.<\/p>\n<h3>1) \u00d6n haz\u0131rl\u0131k: envanter ve sorumluluklar<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>DNS nerede y\u00f6netiliyor?<\/strong> Registrar, DNS host ve gerekiyorsa CDN\/DNS sa\u011flay\u0131c\u0131s\u0131 rollerini netle\u015ftirin.<\/li>\n<li><strong>E-posta kay\u0131t envanteri<\/strong>: MX, SPF, DKIM selector\u2019lar\u0131, DMARC, MTA-STS\/TLS-RPT gibi kay\u0131tlar\u0131n g\u00fcncel bir listesini \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131n.<\/li>\n<li><strong>De\u011fi\u015fiklik ak\u0131\u015f\u0131<\/strong>: Kim DKIM anahtar\u0131 \u00fcretiyor, kim DNS\u2019e giriyor, kim do\u011fruluyor? Bu ak\u0131\u015f net olmal\u0131.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>2) TTL ve zamanlama<\/h3>\n<p>DNSSEC ge\u00e7i\u015fi \u00f6ncesinde TTL de\u011ferlerini ge\u00e7ici olarak d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrmek, geri d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f senaryosunda h\u0131z kazand\u0131rabilir. Ancak TTL\u2019i d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrmenin de cache davran\u0131\u015flar\u0131n\u0131 de\u011fi\u015ftirece\u011fini unutmay\u0131n. Plan\u0131n\u0131z\u0131 mesai saatleri, de\u011fi\u015fiklik penceresi ve izleme s\u00fcresiyle birlikte tasarlay\u0131n.<\/p>\n<h3>3) \u0130mzalama ve DS yay\u0131n\u0131 s\u0131ras\u0131<\/h3>\n<p>Tipik g\u00fcvenli yakla\u015f\u0131m, \u00f6nce zone\u2019u imzalay\u0131p DNSKEY\/RRSIG kay\u0131tlar\u0131n\u0131n do\u011fru \u00fcretildi\u011fini g\u00f6rmek, ard\u0131ndan DS kayd\u0131n\u0131 registrar seviyesinde yay\u0131nlamakt\u0131r. DS yay\u0131nland\u0131\u011f\u0131 an, do\u011frulama yapan resolver\u2019lar g\u00fcven zincirini bekler. Yanl\u0131\u015f DS, hatal\u0131 anahtar veya gecikmeli imza yenileme gibi durumlar sorgular\u0131 bozabilir.<\/p>\n<h3>4) Do\u011frulama testleri<\/h3>\n<p>Ge\u00e7i\u015f s\u0131ras\u0131nda ve sonras\u0131nda hem do\u011frulayan hem do\u011frulamayan resolver\u2019larla kontrol yapmak faydal\u0131d\u0131r. E-posta a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan \u00f6zellikle MX ve kritik TXT kay\u0131tlar\u0131n\u0131n (SPF\/DKIM\/DMARC) \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlemesinin tutarl\u0131 oldu\u011fundan emin olun. DKIM i\u00e7in, aktif selector\u2019lar\u0131n DNS\u2019te do\u011fru g\u00f6r\u00fcnd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc ve rotasyon plan\u0131n\u0131zla \u00e7ak\u0131\u015fmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kontrol edin.<\/p>\n<h3>5) Anahtar y\u00f6netimi ve rotasyon<\/h3>\n<p>DNSSEC anahtarlar\u0131n\u0131n ya\u015fam d\u00f6ng\u00fcs\u00fc, planl\u0131 rotasyon gerektirir. KSK\/ZSK ayr\u0131m\u0131 yapan tasar\u0131mlarda rotasyon ad\u0131mlar\u0131 daha fazlad\u0131r. En kritik konu, rotasyon s\u0131ras\u0131nda DS ve DNSKEY uyumunun bozulmamas\u0131d\u0131r. Ayr\u0131ca kurum i\u00e7inde \u201cDKIM rotasyonu\u201d yapan ekip ile \u201cDNSSEC rotasyonu\u201d yapan ekibin takvimi \u00e7ak\u0131\u015f\u0131rsa beklenmedik do\u011frulama hatalar\u0131 ortaya \u00e7\u0131kabilir.<\/p>\n<h2>Operasyonel tuzaklar: e-posta kesintisine giden tipik hatalar<\/h2>\n<h3>Yanl\u0131\u015f DS veya yanl\u0131\u015f algoritma<\/h3>\n<p>DS kayd\u0131ndaki bir hata, do\u011frulayan resolver\u2019larda domainin DNS yan\u0131tlar\u0131n\u0131 \u201cge\u00e7ersiz\u201d hale getirebilir. Bu durumda MX sorgular\u0131 bile ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olabilir; sonu\u00e7 olarak baz\u0131 g\u00f6ndericiler e-posta teslim edemez.<\/p>\n<h3>\u0130mza yenilemenin durmas\u0131 (expired RRSIG)<\/h3>\n<p>Zone imzas\u0131 d\u00fczenli yenilenmezse RRSIG s\u00fcreleri dolabilir. Bu, DNSSEC do\u011frulamas\u0131nda ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011fa neden olur. DNS otomasyonu, izleme ve uyar\u0131 burada kritik \u00f6nemdedir.<\/p>\n<h3>Par\u00e7al\u0131 y\u00f6netim: birden \u00e7ok panel, birden \u00e7ok ger\u00e7ek<\/h3>\n<p>Baz\u0131 kurumlarda registrar\u2019da ba\u015fka, DNS host\u2019ta ba\u015fka ayarlar bulunabilir. Zone\u2019u nerede bar\u0131nd\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131z ve nerede imzalad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131z net de\u011filse, DS\/anahtar uyumu bozulabilir.<\/p>\n<h2>DNSSEC\u2019i e-posta g\u00fcvenli\u011fi stratejisine nas\u0131l yerle\u015ftirmelisiniz?<\/h2>\n<p>DNSSEC\u2019i, e-posta g\u00fcvenli\u011finde \u201cDNS katman\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flamla\u015ft\u0131ran\u201d bir kontrol olarak d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmek en do\u011fru yakla\u015f\u0131md\u0131r. SPF\/DKIM\/DMARC ve TLS gibi mekanizmalar\u0131 tamamlar; tek ba\u015f\u0131na onlar\u0131n yerini almaz. \u00d6nceliklendirme a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan bakarsak, temel e-posta do\u011frulama kay\u0131tlar\u0131n\u0131z do\u011fru de\u011filse DNSSEC eklemek sorunu \u00e7\u00f6zmez; \u00f6nce do\u011fru kay\u0131t tasar\u0131m\u0131, sonra DNS b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fc hedeflenmelidir.<\/p>\n<p>Sa\u011fl\u0131kl\u0131 bir uygulama i\u00e7in \u00f6nerilen pratik ad\u0131mlar \u015funlard\u0131r:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Mevcut e-posta DNS kay\u0131tlar\u0131n\u0131 sadele\u015ftirin ve dok\u00fcmante edin.<\/li>\n<li>De\u011fi\u015fiklik y\u00f6netimi (kim, ne zaman, nas\u0131l) s\u00fcrecini netle\u015ftirin.<\/li>\n<li>DNSSEC ge\u00e7i\u015fini d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck riskli bir zaman penceresinde, geri d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f plan\u0131yla devreye al\u0131n.<\/li>\n<li>Anahtar ve imza yenileme s\u00fcre\u00e7lerini otomasyon ve izleme ile g\u00fcvenceye al\u0131n.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<h2>Sonu\u00e7: daha g\u00fcvenilir DNS, daha dayan\u0131kl\u0131 e-posta<\/h2>\n<p>E-posta altyap\u0131s\u0131nda g\u00fcven ve s\u00fcreklilik; DNS, kimlik do\u011frulama, TLS, eri\u015fim kontrolleri ve operasyon disiplininin birle\u015fimiyle olu\u015fur. DNSSEC, bu resimde DNS yan\u0131tlar\u0131n\u0131n do\u011frulanabilir olmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flayarak \u00f6zellikle MX ve TXT tabanl\u0131 e-posta kay\u0131tlar\u0131n\u0131n manip\u00fclasyon riskini azalt\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p>Kurumsal e-posta hizmetinizi planlarken veya ta\u015f\u0131ma\/migration s\u00fcre\u00e7lerinde, DNSSEC\u2019i de de\u011ferlendirmek; do\u011fru envanter, do\u011fru s\u0131ra ve do\u011fru izleme ile ilerlemek ak\u0131ll\u0131ca olur. MX1Mail gibi y\u00f6netilen kurumsal e-posta hizmetlerinde de alan ad\u0131 DNS\u2019inin do\u011fru tasarlanmas\u0131, teslimat ve g\u00fcvenlik hedeflerinize daha tutarl\u0131 \u015fekilde ula\u015fman\u0131za yard\u0131mc\u0131 olur.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>DNSSEC\u2019in e-posta DNS kay\u0131tlar\u0131n\u0131z i\u00e7in neyi g\u00fcvence alt\u0131na ald\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131, neyi \u00e7\u00f6zmedi\u011fini ve MX\/SPF\/DKIM\/DMARC i\u00e7in nas\u0131l planlanmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fini \u00f6\u011frenin.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[494],"tags":[487,270,439],"class_list":["post-187","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-dns-ve-e-posta","tag-dnssec","tag-e-posta-dns","tag-kimlik-dogrulama"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mx1mail.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/187","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mx1mail.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mx1mail.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mx1mail.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mx1mail.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=187"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/mx1mail.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/187\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mx1mail.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=187"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mx1mail.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=187"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mx1mail.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=187"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}